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Abstract: Sino-Latin American relations experienced an extraordinary “intensification 
process” throughout the first sixteen years of the 21st century. The present article analyses 
Sino-Latin American relations in the 21st century and proposes three major ideas. First, Sino-
Latin American relations experienced an inflection point in 2001, which initiated an 
unprecedented process that intensified the relationship. Second, since the inflection point in 
2001, the relationship established its foundations by transiting through an economic phase 
between 2001 and 2008, and a soft power phase between 2008 and 2013. Finally, since Xi 
Jinping took office in 2013, Sino-Latin American relations might be entering a 
comprehensive new phase that goes beyond trade and soft power, including the political and 
military-strategic dimensions. The article will be structured as follows: 1) it provides an 
overview of Sino-Latin American relations in the 21st century; 2) then it describes how the 
foundations of the relationship were established in its first two phases; 3) finally, this article 
provides a proposal of a new phase of Sino-Latin American relations since 2013. 
 
Keywords: Sino-Latin American relations, Chinese Foreign Policy, Xi Jinping, China-
CELAC Forum. 
 
Introduction 
Despite the large geographic distance dividing China and Latin America, they have both 
shared a similar position in the international system post-World War II. From Mao Zedong’s 
perspective, both Latin America and the People’s Republic of China were considered to be 
part of the “third world” (Jiang, 2008), being aware of their shared peripheral position in the 
international system and dependent on the developed western “centres.” To avoid isolation in 
such disadvantaged position, China and the Latin American countries supported each other 
throughout the Cold War. They established diplomatic relations and recognised their common 
and uncomfortable situation in between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
 
However, the paths of Latin America and China diverged completely after the end of the Cold 
War in 1989-91. China started to consolidate a major economic reform driven by Deng 
                                                 
1 For practical reasons, most of the time, we will use the term “Latin America” instead of 
“Latin America and the Caribbean”, making explicit reference to the Caribbean each time we 
consider it necessary to underline a point, or to highlight a particularity of the relations 
between this sub-region and China. 
2 Diego Leiva Van de Maele is a PhD Candidate at Griffith University, Australia. E-mail: 
dileiva.vdm@gmail.com; diego.leiva@griffithuni.edu.au 
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Xiaoping in the late 1970s, and to experience the beginning of a large process of economic 
growth, which enabled China to rise to the top positions within the international system’s 
hierarchy. China moved away from Mao’s economic system to a new focus on production and 
exports of manufactured and high technology goods, products with a higher added value. 
Latin America, however, did not succeed in such effort. In the 1950s and 1960s, many Latin 
American governments tried to industrialise their economies through the implementation of 
the import-substituting industrialisation, also known as the ISI Model (Zarate, 2010).  
 
Despite some initial success of the ISI model in Latin America, the experiment ended in the 
1970s and 1980s due to both internal and external problems. Internally, the Latin American 
countries had problems with fiscal imbalance, public debt, and the state’s incapacity to absorb 
enough workers to the industry sector (Bonfati, 2015). The external problems included the 
vulnerability of Latin American economies to external shocks (Bárcena, 2014), the dynamics 
and constrains of the Cold War system, crystallised in the actions and influence3 of the United 
States in the region, and later establishment of neoliberal economic systems in almost every 
country in South America (Martínez Rangel & Soto, 2012).  
 
Without industrialisation, Latin America and the Caribbean remained in a peripheral and 
dependent position within the international system and with a limited capacity of insertion in 
the global value chains (ECLAC, 2013). This outcome was both a curse and a blessing for the 
region. On the one hand, the position was a curse because the Latin American and Caribbean 
economies remained vulnerable to external shocks, as it became clear in the 1980s Debt Crisis 
and the 1990s Asian financial crisis. On the other hand, the position was a blessing because it 
made them attractive to a growing China that needed raw materials and energy resources to 
sustain its “pacific rise/development,” especially since the beginning of its “going out” 
strategy in the late 1990s (Cui, 2016). Ironically, the failure in the industrialisation experience 
gave Latin America the opportunity to become a strategic asset to the now awoken dragon of 
Asia. 
  
                                                 
3 Sometimes intervening directly, as in the case of the U.S. actions against Cuba in 1961 
(Bahia Cochinos), Guatemala and Chile with the CIA-sponsored coup d’état against the 
Arbenz government in 1954, and Allende’s in 1973, respectively, among others in the Cold 
War period (Paz, 2012). 
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The present article analyses Sino-Latin American relations in the 21st century and proposes 
three major ideas. First, Sino-Latin American relations experienced an inflection point in 
2001, which initiated an unprecedented process that intensified the relationship. Second, since 
this inflection point in 2001, the relationship established its foundations by transiting through 
an economic phase between 2001 and 2008, and a soft power phase between 2008 and 2013. 
Finally, since Xi Jinping took office in 2013, Sino-Latin American relations might be entering 
a comprehensive new phase that goes beyond trade and soft power, including the political and 
military-strategic dimensions.  
 
The article will be structured as follows: 1) it provides an overview of Sino-Latin American 
relations in the 21st century; 2) then it describes how the foundations of the relationship were 
established in its first two phases; 3) finally, this article provides a proposal of a new phase of 
Sino-Latin American relations since 2013. 
 
1. Sino – Latin American Relations in the 21st Century: An Overview 
There is no consensus about the first contact between China and Latin America. One very 
interesting hypothesis, but extremely hard to verify, goes back to before the Spanish 
colonisation of the continent, with the Chinese sailor Zheng He and his expedition to the West 
in 1421 (Jiang, 2015). Nonetheless, if we put aside this more anecdotic hypothesis, we can 
track the beginnings of the current Sino-Latin American relations to the early years of the 
People’s Republic of China, particularly since 1960 when Beijing established the China – 
Latin America and the Caribbean Friendship Association (CHILAC) as a part of its people-to-
people diplomacy (Jiang, 2006).  
 
As previously mentioned, throughout the Cold War both China and Latin America supported 
each other to avoid international isolation, especially since the success of the Cuban 
revolution of 1959 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with La Habana in 1961, 
nine years later with Chile, and after that with most of the region during the 1970s and 1980s. 
During that period, both parties backed each other on important political matters, such as the 
vote for granting Beijing’s entrance to the United Nations, and the Latin American claim for 
200-mile territorial sea limits in the Law of the Sea negotiations (Salinas de Dosch & Dosch, 
2015).  
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Nonetheless, Sino-Latin American political and economic interactions were rather limited 
until the beginning of the 21st century, restricted to some political and cultural exchanges 
between politicians and scholars (Jiang, 2006) and an almost irrelevant bilateral trade that 
represented only 1% of Latin America’s exports and less than 1% of its imports in the 1990s 
(Kotschwar, 2014). Another key characteristic of the relations between China and Latin 
America between the 1970s and the beginning of the 21st century was its pragmatism. The 
pragmatic approach of the relations enabling China to keep the political and economic ties 
uninterrupted even after the emergence of several dictatorships in Latin America (Domínguez, 
2006), even with those that were openly Anti-Marxist as was the case with Pinochet’s 
dictatorship in Chile.  
 
The first and most important inflection point of the current Sino-Latin American relations 
came with the advent of the 21st century. During Jiang Zemin’s presidential term (1993 – 
2003), China started to consolidate the economic reforms driven by Deng Xiaoping which 
extended the market system and the openness of the economy (Tisdell, 2009). A major 
achievement of these efforts was China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
in 2001; the negotiation process began in 1986. This accession is one of the main landmarks 
of “Jiang’s era”, leading to a large trend of trade and exchange rate expansion, as seen in 
Table 1: 
 
Table 1: 
 
Source: The World Bank National Accounts Data (2017). 
China: Exports of goods and services (current US$)
in billions of dollars
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Year 1990 1998 2001 2009 2015 
Exports of goods and services 
(current US$) in billions of dollars 51 193 279 1245 2431 
Source: The World Bank National Accounts Data (2017). 
 
To sustain this impressive progress, China needed to secure raw materials and energy 
resources and both were available in Latin America. The fact that China had increasingly 
become a major consumer of natural resources and commodities benefited the region directly 
(Fernández & Hogenboom, 2010) because it initiated a new phase in Sino-Latin American 
economic relations. As we can see in Table 3, the trade between China and Latin America 
was almost irrelevant until the beginning of the 21st century.  
 
Table 3: Sino-Latin American Commerce (millions of dollars) 1950 - 2005 
 
Source: Jiang (2006). 
 
The rise of the Chinese economy and the international “commodities boom” put Latin 
America on China’s radar, especially after the beginning of the Chinese “going out” strategy 
in the late 1990s (Cui, 2016). As Zheng et al. show using ECLAC statistics, China’s demand 
for primary resources increased rapidly from 2000 to 2007, and ultimately occupied 1/2 of the 
global bean oil consumption growth, 1/3 of soybean, 1/2 of refined copper, 3/4 of refined 
aluminium and zinc spelter, 1/3 of steel products, and over 1/3 of petroleum (Zheng, Sun & 
Yue, 2012). This demand raised the primary product prices in Latin American enormously 
(Zheng, Sun & Yue, 2012).   
 
The appearance of this huge market for Latin American exports had a significant “game 
changing effect” on bilateral relations (Hardy, 2013). In addition, Beijing’s accession to the 
WTO made things easier and “safer” for Latin American countries, especially considering that 
it now allowed them to trade under the WTO rules and act against China through its 
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mechanisms if necessary. In fact, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela instituted  204 anti-dumping investigation cases against Chinese products, and they 
placed 140 anti-dumping measures against Chinese commodities between 1995 and 2010 (Lu, 
2012).  
 
In spite of these investigations, Sino-Latin American trade remained stable even during and 
after the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. During the global financial crisis, China’s 
exports to the region dropped by 20%. Its imports from Latin America dropped as well, by 
10%,  rapidly recovering to the pre-crisis level of both exports and imports by 2010 (Lu, 
2012). Between 2000 and 2013 Sino-Latin American trade increased by 22%, going from US 
$12 billion in 2000 to nearly US $275 billion in 2013 (ECLAC, 2015), decreasing 11% 
between 2013 and 2015 as a consequence of both the Chinese and Latin American economy 
deceleration processes, reaching US$ 247 billion (ECLAC, 2016). 
 
In the next sections, I will propose a new way of organising the Sino-Latin American relations 
since 2001 that includes three distinct phases. It is important to clarify that these phases are 
not independent from each other. On the contrary, every phase sets the foundations for the 
next phase and in this manner, each time period should not be considered a “zero starting 
point” separated from the preceding period, but should instead be regarded as a gradual and 
incremental process. 
 
2. Establishing the Foundations of the Relationship: First Two Phases 
The economy (and more specifically, trade) was the first and most important dimension 
developed between China and Latin America in the first phase of their relationship. I label 
this time period the Economic Phase (2001 – 2008). I consider 2001 as the first inflection 
point4 of Sino-Latin American relations, even though some authors prefer 2004 due to the 
relevance of Hu Jintao’s trip to the region (Dosch & Jacob, 2010; Jenkins, 2015; Salinas de 
Dosch & Dosch, 2015). I use 2001 in order to be more accurate in the analysis by highlighting 
Jiang Zemin’s contributions to breaking the inertia of the relationship after 30 years of 
diplomatic relations with limited advances. 
                                                 
4 Several scholars agree that the current state of the relationship began in the 2000s 
(Domínguez, 2006; Arès, Deblock & Lin, 2011; Lu, 2012; Zheng, Sun & Yue, 2012; 
Rodríguez & Leiva, 2013; Kotschwar, 2014; Cypher & Wilson, 2015). 
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Sino-Latin American trade began to increase rapidly after the very first years of the new 
century. This was especially true after 2001 because of the “commodities boom” and the 
entrance of China in the WTO, surpassing the 10 billion dollars of bilateral trade mark in 
2000 and beginning with the “super cycle” of growth that endured until 2009: 
 
Graph 1: China, Latin America and the Caribbean trade 1985 – 2009  
(billions of dollars) 
 
Source: ECLAC (2011). 
 
As Domínguez suggests, the 2001 visit of Jiang Zemin to the region should be considered as a 
major milestone for the new relations between Beijing and Latin America, because it “sparked 
a wave of subsequent visits by senior officials and business leaders between China and Latin 
America to discuss political, economic, and military concerns” (Domínguez, 2006: 2). Visits 
that yielded positive results in terms of agreements and improved mutual understanding.  
 
Although the latter was of great significance in the beginning of the process, the main 
milestone of this first phase was Hu Jintao’s 2004 trip to the region to attend the APEC 
summit in Chile. He spent fourteen days in several countries in order to foster the long-term 
construction of China’s policy towards Latin America (Domínguez, 2006). After the summit, 
Hu Jintao returned to Beijing after having started the negotiations with Chile to consolidate 
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the first Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in Latin America—the agreement was consolidated in 
2005 and in force in 2006. The foundations of the relations were established, but remained 
within the economic dimension. 
 
The second phase, or the Soft Power Phase (2008 – 2013), started with the release of the 
2008 Chinese White Paper “Documento sobre la Política de China hacia América Latina y el 
Caribe” (Document on China’s Policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean).5  This 
document made a major effort to clarify, in Spanish, what China was doing in the region and 
how it intended to continue doing it. The document became a significant soft power tool to 
counter the “Chinese threat” theories emerging in the West and Japan. The document also 
represents the addition of the political dimension into the Sino-Latin American relations. 
 
Hu Jintao was the first Chinese president who explicitly strived for the expansion of the 
Chinese soft power in the world. He incorporated the idea in official speeches and assigned 
resources to public diplomacy to fulfil that task. He also established a new foreign policy 
strategy under the concept of “China’s peaceful development” (he changed the original name, 
pacific “rise”, to avoid misunderstandings). In 2005, he released a White Paper entitled 
“China’s Path to Peaceful Development”, explaining China’s new foreign policy objectives 
(Cho & Jeong, 2008; Glaser & Murphy, 2009).  
 
The expansion of the Chinese soft power in the region included efforts to increase political, 
economic, cultural and even military cooperation (Rodríguez & Leiva, 2013). It also included 
fundraising for cultural and artistic exchanges, expanding its media coverage to the region 
(Xinhua and CCTV started to broadcast in Spanish) and establishing more than 30 Confucius 
Institutes in Latin America (Hanban, 2016). The image of China had to be enhanced, and as 
regards that task, Hu Jintao seems to have succeeded, at least by maintaining a stable 
favourable image of China in the region. China’s efforts to maintain a favourable image can 
be seen on the following graphs: 
 
 
                                                 
5 The document includes an introduction about Sino – Latin American relations, a 
characterization of the Chinese policy towards the region (goals and ways to achieve them), 
and it describes the economic, political, cultural and security dimensions of it. 
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Table 10: How the world sees China 
 
 
Source: Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project (2007, 2014).  
Black squares were added to the original tables by the author. 
 
 
As clarified before, each phase builds upon the bases of the previous one, and that is exactly 
what Hu Jintao’s government did in the economic dimension. In order to sustain the 
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“economic momentum” and overcome the global crisis of 2008 and 2009, the Chinese 
government strove to push the relationship one step forward. The government established 
“strategic partnerships” with Peru (2008) and Chile (2012), signed the FTAs with Peru in 
2008 (in force in 2010) and with Costa Rica in 2010 (in force in 2011). The government also 
increased investment in the region, doubling the Chinese stock in the region until 2009 by 
spending 14 billion dollars in 2010 (ECLAC, 2016).  
 
Another factor worth considering is the fact that China helped Latin America overcome the 
global finance crisis (Vadell, 2013). This is in sharp contrast with the efforts of the United 
States, which decided not to come to the rescue of the region (Chávez, 2015). This decision 
contributed to the positive image that China managed to maintain during Hu’s term. As we 
can observe in the following graph on the goods trade between 2000 and 2014, all these 
efforts helped sustain the stable and growing Sino-Latin American economic relations, 
reaching the bilateral trade value (imports plus exports) of US$ 275 billion in 2013 (ECLAC, 
2015). 
 
Graph 2: Goods Trade between China and Latin America 2000 – 2013  
(millions of dollars) 
 
Source: ECLAC (2015). 
 
Hu’s government also succeeded, after a long diplomatic effort, in getting Costa Rica to have 
a recognition “flip” from Taiwan to Beijing in 2007. It would have been an even greater 
success if it had started a “Domino effect” of recognition in the region, however, this never 
happened.  
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Along with the economic success and the enhancement of the Chinese soft power in the 
region, Hu Jintao’s government incorporated the political and military dimensions to the 
Sino-Latin American relations equation, increasing the number of bilateral official visits. Hu 
Jintao visited the region to discuss these matters four times—in 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010—
and Jiang Zemin only visited once in 2001. China expanded its soft power in the region and 
incorporated political and military issues by developing and releasing the 2008 White Paper 
on China’s policy towards the region and opening the cooperation in the military dimension 
through high ranked bilateral visits. China also held an incipient conventional arms sales, 
participated in the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 to 2012, and 
participated in  the 2010 joint humanitarian exercise held with Peru among other activities 
(Rodríguez & Leiva, 2013). 
 
3. The Arrival of Xi Jinping: Entering A New Phase in Sino - Latin American Relations? 
In the previous section, I presented the first two steps of an ongoing process of deepening and 
intensifying Sino-Latin American relations. As we observed, since 2001 the relationship has 
gradually incorporated different dimensions, though it focused predominantly on the 
economic realm between 2001 and 2013.  
 
Since the arrival to office of Xi Jinping in 2013, the Chinese foreign policy seems to be 
experiencing some significant changes. These changes are characterised by a transition from a 
low profile strategy to a more active and assertive one (Ríos, 2013; Zhao, 2013; Yan, 2014; 
Cook, 2015; Szczudlik-Tatar, 2015; Zheng & Gore, 2015). Either directly or indirectly related 
to this foreign policy shift, as of 2013 we can observe some evidence of changes in the 
Chinese approach towards the region, signs that might suggest the beginning of a new phase 
in Sino-Latin American relations, here labelled the Comprehensive phase (since 2013).  
 
Political Dimension 
The first hints of change can be found in the political dimension. Building on the advances 
made by Hu Jintao in the political realm, Xi Jinping seems to be willing to strengthen the 
relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole and go beyond bilateralism. He 
also has a different discourse and approach from the one presented and projected by Hu and 
the 2008’s White Paper. With only three years in office, Xi Jinping has already visited the 
region on three occasions. In 2013, he visited Mexico, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago and 
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arranged high level meetings with officials in Antigua, Barbuda, the Bahamas, and Jamaica. 
In 2014, he visited Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Cuba. Then in 2016, he visited Peru, 
Ecuador and Chile. Overall, Xi Jinping has already made almost the same number of trips that 
Hu Jintao made in his entire governmental term.  
 
As in the case of Hu Jintao, every trip Xi Jinping took to the region had a specific purpose; it 
was either to sign agreements or to push forward particular projects or initiatives. The 
difference with Hu relies on the character of those purposes; while he still focused on 
economic matters, he also had a much stronger political dimension. The two examples that 
illustrate this point are the foundation of the China-CELAC Forum in 2014 and the release of 
a new Chinese White Paper on China’s policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean in 
2016. 
 
Established in 2011 the “Community of Latin American and Caribbean States” (Comunidad 
de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, CELAC, in Spanish) represents the most recent 
Latin American effort to achieve a higher level of autonomy. It includes all 33 members of the 
region and, contrary to the Organisation of American States (OAS), it excludes the United 
States and Canada. Thus, CELAC is gradually replacing the OAS as the main Latin American 
arena to discuss and resolve regional issues and conflicts. The appeal of the new organisation 
is hard to overlook, considering the fact that for the first time in history Latin America and the 
Caribbean managed to establish a proper regional organisation without the presence of the 
northern hegemon.  
 
Xi Jinping’s government quickly understood the relevance and opportunities behind the 
creation of CELAC and pushed forward a process to institutionalise China’s relation with the 
organisation in 2014. This assertive move was noticed by one of the most relevant U.S. 
specialists on Sino-Latin American relations, Evan Ellis, stating that, 
 
the “China-CELAC Forum” is strategically important for the P.R.C. because it 
allows it to engage with the region as a whole, in a way that excludes the United 
States and Canada. The action highlights the boldness of Chinese President Xi 
Jinping and the new 5th generation of P.R.C. leadership in not refraining from an 
action simply because it might be seen as a threat by some parties within the 
United States (Ellis, 2014: 1). 
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The outcomes of that first summit were the Beijing Declaration, the institutional arrangements 
of the forum, and the “China-Latin America and the Caribbean Cooperation Plan 2015-2019”. 
This declaration and plan crystallise Xi’s new initiative, the “1+3+6” cooperation framework, 
which consists of “one” plan; “three” engines to promote the comprehensive development of 
the cooperation (trade, investment and financial cooperation); and “six” fields that has to be 
prioritised (energy and resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, 
scientific and technological innovation, and information technologies) (Inter-American 
Dialogue, 2015). The Cooperation Plan aims to increase Sino-Latin American trade by 500 
billion dollars and to invest 250 billion dollars into the region (Xinhua, 2015). 
 
It is extremely ambitious and it goes from economics (trade, investment, infrastructure, etc.) 
to sociocultural, political, and even security matters (including cyber-security). If it is actually 
implemented, this would represent a significant effort to push the relationship one step 
further. Moreover, the plan includes all 33 members of CELAC, this is a relevant fact for two 
reasons. First, this is a huge potential market. Second, behind Xi Jinping’s approach to the 
regional organisation we can find a very important political factor directly related to one of 
the most complex issues on Chinese politics: the international recognition of Taiwan.  
 
From the 20 countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei (21 if we consider 
the Holy See), 12 are located in Latin America and the Caribbean (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of China, 2016). These include Belize, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, St. Lucia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, the Federation 
of Saint Christopher and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. As mentioned before, 
Hu Jintao’s efforts to start a “Domino effect” of recognition in the region after the Costa 
Rican flip in 2007 did not succeed. The status quo remains untouched, especially after the 
commencement of the diplomatic truce between Beijing and Taiwan in 2008.  
 
However, the truce may be coming to an end. Since Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe flipped 
recognitions to Beijing in March and December 2016, respectively, the Taiwan issue in Latin 
America and the Caribbean could become important again. Although it is too soon to affirm 
this claim with certainty, there are some signs that Xi Jinping is interested in tackling the 
issue by strengthening China’s relation with the Caribbean. As Antonio Hsiang suggests, Xi 
Jinping’s trip to Trinidad and Tobago in 2013 had a strategic purpose of increasing China’s 
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influence in that sub-region, taking advantage of the United States’ continuous withdrawal in 
Central America and the Caribbean (Hsiang, 2016). 
 
Moreover, it was the first visit of a Chinese leader to a Caribbean country different from 
Cuba, a traditional destination chosen by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as well. During that trip, 
Xi Jinping had the opportunity to hold high level meetings with officials of Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, and Jamaica. That was the starting point of an unprecedented 
intensification process of Chinese cooperation in the Caribbean. This cooperation included 3 
billion dollars in loans to the Caribbean in 2013 (Goodman, 2013) and a military agreement 
between China and Trinidad and Tobago worth 4.7 million dollars (Caribbean News Now, 
2014). It also includes Chinese funding and construction of Jamaica’s North South Highway 
Project—the largest development project on the island that began in 2014, with an investment 
of 600 million dollars in loans (Cann, 2016). China also helped with the construction of a 40 
billion dollars stadium in Grenada, commenced in 2014 and finished in 2016 (Niland, 2016); 
and the funding and construction of a 40 billion dollars hospital in Dominica (Dominica Vibes 
News, 2016), among several other projects in the region. 
 
Even though most of the cases before presented are countries that recognise Beijing as the 
legitimate government of China, this unprecedented flow of cooperation could eventually 
attract some of the Taiwan allies to Beijing’s side. The second major example of the rising 
political character of Xi Jinping’s government approach towards Latin America and the 
Caribbean was the release of a new White Paper titled “China’s Policy Paper on Latin 
America and the Caribbean”6 in November 2016. It was published in Spanish and English 
(covering the languages of the 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean). Similar to 
the 2008 version, the White Paper of 2016 builds on the documents elaborated within the first 
China-CELAC Forum summit of 2015. Unlike the White Paper of 2008, which focused 
mainly on the economic and sociocultural dimensions of the relationship, Xi Jinping’s paper 
has a strong political and ideological approach.  
 
The 2016 White Paper starts summarising everything that has been done up until 2016, and 
                                                 
6 Available in English: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml; and 
in Spanish: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/esp/zxxx/t1418256.shtml. 
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mentions the 2008 White Paper and the achievements of the new China-CELAC Forum. The 
White Paper explicitly states that, 
 
since 2013, the Chinese leadership has set forth a series of major initiatives and 
measures on strengthening China’s relations and cooperation with Latin America 
and the Caribbean in a wide range of areas, which has provided new development 
goals and new driving forces for the relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2016: 1). 
 
Thus reaffirming the idea of the beginning of a new phase in Sino – Latin American relations 
by explicitly stating that, “the relations have entered a new stage of comprehensive 
cooperation” (Ibid.).  
 
One of the most significant changes from the previous version is the new emphasis given to 
international collaboration and peace/security issues. The White papers focus on more than 
just economic multilateral coordination, they specifically mention the importance of the Sino-
Latin American cooperation on “international political affairs,” and strive to promote 
  
multi-polarization and democracy in international relations, enhance the voice of 
developing countries in international affairs, and safeguard common interests of 
both sides as well as other developing countries (Ibid.) 
 
 - especially in the United Nations.  
 
Furthermore, the 2016 document addresses the security/military dimension in a different more 
assertive manner than the previous one. The 2016 document explicitly mentions the need for 
collaboration in Cyber Security and a willingness to,  
 
expand pragmatic cooperation in humanitarian relief, counter-terrorism and other 
non-traditional security fields, and enhance cooperation in military trade and 
military technology (Ibid.).  
 
If everything presented is developed, this will signal the beginning of a new comprehensive 
phase in Sino-Latin American relations. 
 
As it is only a document, and a very recent one, I cannot state with certainty that it will guide 
the Sino-Latin American relations in that comprehensive direction. However, it is worthwhile 
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to highlight that it could eventually become a significant factor in China’s foreign policy 
towards the region. After all, this happened with the 2008 version. This new 2016 version was 
perceived positively in Latin America and its approval crystallised in the Beijing Declaration. 
This 2016 document has received more support than the previous document which only had 
the official support of Mexico, Chile and Brazil (Creutzfeldt, 2013). 
 
The recent establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank and the implication that it 
has on the strengthening of the South-South cooperation framework can be considered as 
another political factor that might have an indirect effect on the current Sino-Latin American 
relations. The involvement of Brazil, the main Latin American regional power, as founding 
member of the New Developing Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
could eventually help to increase the influence of the region in the global system, and to 
attract more funding and investment to the region. This is part of a broader process to strength 
South-South relations as pushed forward by Xi Jinping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2016).  
 
Military/Strategic Dimension 
Since 2013, the military/strategic dimension has also developed significantly, reaffirming the 
idea of a new comprehensive phase in Sino-Latin American relations. The first evidence of 
this deepening process can be observed in the Chinese arms sales to the region, which was 
mostly limited during the first fifteen years of the 21st century with the exception of the Sino-
Venezuelan case. The slow pace of arms sales was understandable considering Beijing’s low 
profile strategy and the unwillingness of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s governments to raise 
concerns in Washington about its presence in Latin America, a situation that may be changing 
with Xi Jinping. 
 
In the following graph, we can see patterns of the value of arms imports from China by 
country: 
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Graph 3: Value of Arms Imports from China by Latin American Country 
 
Source: Wilson (2015). 
 
Although not exclusively, left wing ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de 
nuestra América) countries of South America, such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia have 
had the most arms imports. They have imported K-8 combat airplanes and JYL-1 radars, MA-
60 transport airplanes, WMZ-551 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), AK-47 assault rifles 
and boats, artillery, and infantry ammunition and trucks, among several other items (Malena, 
2012). The value of those arms sales and exchanges bordered the 100 million dollars per year 
between 2000 and 2015 (Piccone, 2016). This limited trade allowed China to develop its 
military cooperation relations with the region without raising concerns in the United States. 
 
Nevertheless, as Jordan Wilson suggests, the Sino-Argentinean military agreement of 2015 
might represent an inflection point in this dimension (Wilson, 2015). The agreement is valued 
in 500 million to one billion dollars, it contains a wide range of items including aircrafts, 
naval vessels, amphibious APCs, military to military exchanges (exchange programs between 
the People’s Liberation Army and the Argentinean Army), space cooperation, among other 
dimensions within the military/strategic field.  
 
If implemented, it would, 
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alter the scope of China’s military exports to the region, representing a new level 
of volume, competitiveness, and technological sophistication and potentially 
creating inroads to other regional markets (Wilson, 2015: 3).  
 
Just by looking at the numbers it would represent a significant “leap forward” from the nearly 
130 million dollars of Chinese military sales to the region in 2014 (Piccone, 2016). It also 
represents an expression of the increasing credibility of the Chinese technology quality in the 
military field within Latin America.  
 
Even though some analysts have some doubts about the actual crystallisation of the agreement 
after the triumph of the right wing candidate Mauricio Macri (Fiegel, 2016; Piccone, 2016), 
the more recent signals of the Argentinean government seem to confirm that the agreements 
with China will be honoured, beginning with the space and nuclear cooperation. This is 
especially the case after and partly due to Donald Trump’s election as president of the United 
States (Tomás, 2017). 
 
The second and third domains in which we can find some evidence of deepening relations 
between China and Latin America are the satellite and nuclear cooperation. The cooperation 
process for the satellite began in Brazil during the late 1990s and during Hu Jintao’s 
government (2003 – 2012) for Venezuela and Bolivia7. The cooperation continued with Xi 
Jinping and Bolivia successfully launching the first Bolivian “Tupac Katari” Satellite in 2013 
(Salvacion, 2015). Brazil also successfully launched a satellite in 2013 and 2014 (CBERS-3 
and CBERS-4, respectively) (Satélite Sino-Brasileiro de Recursos terrestres, 2017). In 
addition, in 2016, Venezuela announced its third satellite called  “Sucre”, which is intended to 
be launched in September 2017 (La Radio del Sur, 2016). 
 
However, in the case of arms sales, Argentina is the country that is breaking new ground as 
regards the Sino-Latin American relations. Argentina is allowing China to increase and 
deepen its cooperation dimensions by agreeing to let China construct its first Space-
Monitoring station outside its territory, which will be located in Neuquén, Patagonia. As I will 
explain below, it has a significant strategic importance, and it represents an unprecedented 
                                                 
7 The satellite launches were in 1999, 2003 and 2007 for Brazil, and 2008 and 2012 for 
Venezuela, starting the process with Bolivia in 2010 (Ellis, 2012; Quinones, 2012; Satélite 
Sino-Brasileiro de Recursos terrestres, 2017). 
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milestone in the Chinese physical presence in the region as the station is controlled by the 
PLA. The construction continued even after the elections of President Mauricio Macri and it 
is in its final stage, awaiting the approval to operate by the Argentinean government 
(INFOBAE, 2017). 
 
Buenos Aires has also broken new ground in the nuclear field. Once again, Argentina is the 
country that seems to be most willing to trust and cooperate with China in the 
military/strategic field and has been working with and allowing Beijing to develop and use its 
own technology. In 2015, both countries signed an agreement for the construction of the 
fourth and fifth nuclear power plants (INFOBAE, 2015), the first one with Canadian 
technology (CANDU reactor) and the second one with Chinese technology (Clarín, 2016). As 
I have explained before, despite the doubts about the new Argentinean government’s 
willingness to honour the agreements with China, Argentina reaffirmed most of them when 
Donald Trump was elected president of the United States.  
 
In this case, Mauricio Macri explicitly said “Por suerte tenemos las centrales” (“Luckily we 
have the nuclear power plants”) referring to the Chinese projects and his determination to 
push them through (Tomás, 2017). Brazil also seems to be willing to follow that path of joint 
cooperation in the nuclear domain and started negotiations in 2016 to construct the ANGRA – 
3 nuclear power plant with China (Globo, 2016). These significant projects lead us to the last 
set of evidence of the changing character of Sino-Latin American relations as of 2013, one 
characterised by strategic infrastructure projects. 
 
The first enormous infrastructure project was the Nicaraguan Canal. It was approved in 2013 
after extensive negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and the Chinese consortium 
Hong Kong Nicaragua Development (HKND). The project involves an investment of 50 
billion dollars and a 50-year concession to HKND in order to build a 278 km Canal, three 
times longer than the Panama Canal, and two times wider and deeper (Fuente, 2016).  
 
The project began in December 2014 and it is supposed to be finished by 2020, with a 
promise of generating 200,000 jobs (BBC Mundo, 2014). However, it has experienced a lot of 
problems, especially due to the resistance from the local community (Ray, Gallagher & 
Sarmiento, 2016), who are worried about the environmental damage that it will bring (BBC, 
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2015). The construction stopped in order to undergo more social and environmental impact 
studies. However, the HKND Chairman Wang Jing announced that the project should restart 
between 2016 and 2017 as he congratulated the re-election of Daniel Ortega as president of 
Nicaragua (La Gente, 2016).  
 
Figure 1: Nicaraguan Canal Project 
 
Source: BBC news (2014) [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-28206683]. 
 
The relevance of the Nicaraguan Canal is not just economic, although it will be a major game 
changer in terms of trade considering the fact that it could replace the monopoly of the 
Panama Canal on that route8. It is also a strategic project, because it will enable China to 
obtain control of a key route of the world’s commerce, as the United States did with the 
Panama Canal a century ago. Moreover, the massive investment could help to reinforce the 
Chinese relationship with the Nicaraguan government, who still maintains diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan. 
 
The second infrastructure megaproject on the list is the Trans-Oceanic Railroad connecting 
Brazil and Peru (and possibly Bolivia as well), with an estimated cost of 10 billion dollars 
(Lissardy, 2015). The negotiations started in 2013 and by 2014, the first agreement was 
signed in order to create a working group on railway development (Inter-American Dialogue, 
2016). However, the negotiations are still ongoing. Bolivia has manifested its intention to 
become a part of the project (Ibid.), Europe has presented an alternative project (El Comercio, 
                                                 
8 China has already started to increase its participation in the Panama Canal by investing 110 
million dollars to expand Panama’s Balboa Port, a port controlled by Panama Ports Company, 
a unit of Hong Kong-based conglomerate Hutchison Whampoa Ltd (Reuters, 2014). 
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2016), and there are several environmental and social obstacles involving more than 600 
indigenous communities that could slow down the development of this project (Ortiz, 2015). 
 
Figure 2: Trans-Oceanic Railroad Project 
 
Source: The Guardian (2015)  
[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/16/amazon-china-railway-plan]. 
 
This project has also enormous economic and strategic relevance. It would not only 
significantly facilitate trade between China and Latin America, but it would “add points” and 
increase Beijing’s influence in the region by helping it to tackle one of the main historic 
economic problems of Latin America, the lack of proper transport infrastructure connectivity 
(ECLAC, 2014).  
 
The last project on the list is probably the most polemic one of the three: the Space-
Monitoring Chinese Base in Neuquén, Argentinean Patagonia. In April 2014, the Argentinean 
government of Cristina Kirchner signed a 50-year contract with Xi Jinping’s government for 
the construction and use of the first Chinese Space-Monitoring Base outside their territory, 
including steerable parabolic antennas 13.5 and 35 meters in diameter, computer and 
engineering facilities, lodgings for technical staff, and a 10 million dollars electric power 
plant, with the intention of becoming operational in March 2017 (Robert Lee, 2016).  
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Figure 3: Space-Monitoring Chinese Base Project 
 
Source: The Diplomat (2016)  
[http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-builds-space-monitoring-base-in-the-americas/]. 
 
The base will be controlled by the People’s Liberation Army, raising concerns not only in 
Argentina but also in the United States, especially considering the fact that the Argentinean 
government will be able to use up to 10% of the station antenna time (Wilson, 2015), a very 
limited access despite being located on Argentine territory (Ellis, 2015). Evan Ellis (2013) 
goes a little bit further, raising concerns about the potential strategic significance of the base, 
and the Chinese telecommunications network in Latin America in general, considering the 
fact that these assets could eventually be used against the U.S. government and industries, 
stating that cyber-warfare is a real possibility. 
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The base is extremely relevant for Beijing in strategic terms, not only because it will facilitate 
the realisation of future missions to the moon and Mars9, but also because it will provide 
China with a southern hemisphere node to communicate immediately with its satellites and 
spacecraft when they are positioned over the region. This will make it possible to download 
images or conduct orbital adjustments without waiting for them to fly over Chinese territory 
(Wilson, 2015).  
 
Officially, the base will not be used for military purposes, though this position was not clearly 
defined in the first agreement and is raising the already mentioned concerns. In order to 
dissipate those concerns, in September 2016, the Chinese and Argentine governments signed 
an addendum to the original agreement, stating explicitly that the base will not be used for 
military purposes, but for pacific ones (Dinatale, 2016). As I mentioned before, the base is 
already in its final phase, only awaiting the approval of the Argentinean government to 
operate. 
 
Economic Dimension 
I have already presented the two major dimensions that have been incorporated into the Sino-
Latin American relationship as of 2013. These include the political and military/strategic 
domains. There is enough evidence to suggest that we might be seeing the beginning of a new 
comprehensive phase of Sino-Latin American relations. However, it is worth mentioning two 
factors that could eventually reshape the character of the Sino – Latin American economic 
dimension as well. The first one is the decision of the Chinese government to move from 
upstream to downstream investment in the region, contributing to the development of supply 
chains within Latin America (Ray and Gallagher, 2017).  
 
As Pérez states, one of the factors that could explain these changes is the slowdown of the 
Chinese economy and the impact that it has had on Chinese companies, which are more 
willing to invest outside of the country (Pérez Ludeña, 2017). In 2015, only 1/3 of the 
Chinese investment in the region has been on the primary sector (Ibid.), but it is still not 
enough evidence of a concrete diversification process.  
 
                                                 
9 The Chinese government hopes to use the base to support an upcoming lunar mission in 
2017 (Ray and Gallagher, 2017).  
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However, if it was actually happening it would be consistent with the 2016 White Paper, in 
which the Chinese government explicitly states that, 
 
efforts will be made to bring cooperation to upstream business such as exploration 
and development, so as to consolidate the foundation for cooperation and expand 
resources potentials; and at the same time, cooperation will be extended to 
downstream and supporting industries such as smelting, processing, logistics trade 
and equipment manufacturing, so as to improve added value of products (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016: 1).  
 
Ray and Gallagher noticed some early signs, which suggest that China is taking the initial 
steps towards downstream industries. In 2016, the top five Chinese FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) projects in Latin America included investment deals on steel and iron mills, an 
automobile factory, and a prefabricated house factory. These are indicative of China’s 
willingness to collaborate with Latin America on a new approach to the region’s historical 
goal of industrialisation (Ray and Gallagher, 2017). 
 
The second sign of change in the economic dimension of the cooperation comes from the 
establishment of the China Construction Bank in Chile in 2016. The approval to operate was 
granted in May 2016 after an extensive negotiation process that started in 2014. The bank 
opened with a 2.2 billion dollars currency swap agreement between China and Chile to 
facilitate the exchanges for three years (Reuters, 2016). It is too soon to make any assessments 
on its impact on Sino-Latin American relations, but it is safe to state that it could contribute to 
expand the internationalisation of the Chinese currency (renminbi). Both cases are too recent 
to be taken as concrete evidence of changes in the character of Sino-Latin American 
economic relations, but it is worth highlighting and keeping track of them as they have the 
potential to become relevant components of the new comprehensive phase. 
 
Conclusion: More than Just Economics 
Sino-Latin American relations experienced an extraordinary intensification process 
throughout the first sixteen years of the 21st century. Until now, the majority of the analysis 
on the subject has focused on the economic complementarity of the relationship, being the 
most noticeable developed aspect since 2001. Nevertheless, as I suggest in the present article, 
the economic dimension is not the only one that has developed since 2001. In fact, I state that 
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the relationship has evolved from the economic and soft power dimensions to the political, 
military, and strategic dimensions. 
 
This article processes three phases; this diverts from most of the literature on Sino-Latin 
American relations, which highlights only two major moments: one in 2004 with Hu Jintao’s 
trip to the region, and the other one in 2008 with the release of the Chinese Paper about its 
policy towards Latin America. By highlighting the arrival to office of Xi Jinping as an 
inflection point both for China’s politics (internal and foreign policy) and Sino-Latin 
American relations, I present evidence of the beginning of a new comprehensive phase that 
started in 2013 and focuses on political and military/strategic fields, along with the still 
relevant economic field. 
 
In the political dimension, I highlighted the increasing influence of Xi Jinping on the 
Caribbean as a relevant factor related to the Taiwan issue, along with the establishment of the 
China-CELAC forum and the China-CELAC cooperation plan for 2015-2019. I also 
presented evidence of changes in the military dimension. For instance, there has been an 
increase in arms sales values after the 2015 Sino-Argentinean agreement, an emerging 
cooperation with satellites and nuclear energy, and a new focus on strategic infrastructure 
projects in the Nicaraguan Canal, the Trans-Oceanic Railroad Project, and the Space 
Monitoring Base in Neuquén, Argentinean Patagonia. 
 
Moreover, I highlighted some signs of changes in the economic character of the relationship, 
both in investment (from upstream to downstream industries) and in the expansion of the 
Yuan in the region. However, these last trends are too recent to be considered at the same 
level as the political and military ones. Nevertheless, they are changes worth highlighting so 
as to keep track of them, as they could potentially become important components of the 
economic relation. 
 
As a recent article published by The Economist suggests, the election of Donald Trump as 
president of the United States could eventually consolidate the changes presented in this 
article, as there are signs of the lack of willingness of Washington to re-fill the political 
vacuum left by George W. Bush and Barack Obama in the region. This allows China to 
present itself as “a stabiliser” of the region (The Economist, 2017).  
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Considering this potentially crucial external factor, along with all the previously presented 
factors, I can safely suggest that our main hypothesis is confirmed as we are experiencing 
significant changes in the dynamics and character of Sino-Latin American relations, which are 
still focused on economic relations, but are also going beyond the economic realm and 
incorporating the political and military/strategic dimensions; thus, consolidating a 
comprehensive relationship. Nonetheless, we will have to wait and see if China will seize the 
opportunity to consolidate the new comprehensive phase in Sino-Latin American relations in 
the following years.  
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